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Abstract 
In response to concerns that capitalism yields prosperity only at the cost of rising inequality, this paper 
draws upon examples from employment law and corporate governance to argue that the legal 
framework should reflect a broad understanding of economic wellbeing that encompasses both the 
costs and the benefits of corporate activity. To the extent that economic growth expands the scope of 
corporate welfare provision for employees in large firms, the preoccupation with distributive matters 
such as executive pay ratios is misplaced; in this context the ideal of equality matters not for its own 
sake but more because it offers a means of achieving human flourishing and fuller participation in 
social and economic life. The paper shows how this insight would help to ease the growing financial 
pressure on state-guaranteed social security, particularly in the context of increasing numbers of self-
employed workers in the gig economy. 
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The acceptable face of capitalism: 
law, corporations and economic wellbeing 
Wanjiru Njoya1 
1. Introduction: the two faces of capitalism 
 
‘Inequality is the handmaiden of progress’.2 
Capitalism is lauded for its associations with liberty, progress and prosperity; it is derided for 
being oblivious to glaring social and economic inequality. How should we evaluate the benefit 
of progress, if it appears to come at an unacceptable social cost? More specifically, when 
should law intervene in the interests of advancing the goals of social justice? These questions 
lie at the heart of global concerns about economic development. It may well be the case that 
Victorian England exhibited the worst excesses of unregulated and exploitative 
industrialization, or that modern CEOs portray the ‘unacceptable face of capitalism’3 in one 
scandal after the other when they profit at the expense of the corporation, its workers and 
the wider society. But it is to twenty-first century Africa that we should look in order fully to 
appreciate the grim realities in jurisdictions where competitive capitalism has yet to put down 
secure and independent roots.4 In The Truth About Markets John Kay recounts the experience 
of Tanzania under the leadership of Julius Nyerere, the illustrious president who sought to 
bring progress to his beautiful but impoverished pre-industrial country by prioritizing social 
                                                          
1 University of Exeter, UK. Email: w.n.njoya@exeter.ac.uk. I am grateful to Bruce Pardy for many helpful 
discussions on the themes of this paper. I am also grateful to Marc Moore and the Editor of the Kings Law Journal 
for helpful comments on previous drafts. 
2 A Deaton, The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality (Princeton University Press 2013), 6: 
In this study Deaton highlights both progress and inequality: ‘I tell the story of material progress, but that story 
is one of both growth and inequality’ (emphasis in the original). 
3 House of Commons, BHS: First Report of the Work and Pensions Committee and Fourth Report of the 
Business, Innovation and Skills Committee of Session 2016–17 (20 July, 2016) par 168. 
4 In this discussion capitalism refers to ‘competitive capitalism – the organization of the bulk of economic activity 
through private enterprise operating in a free market – as a system of economic freedom and a necessary 
condition for political freedom’: M Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press 1962) 2002 
edition, 4. Therefore, ‘capitalism’ is not simply shorthand for the ‘very greedy people’ or ‘unrestrained 
individualism’ associated with corrupt third world governments as depicted by J Kay, The Truth about Markets: 
Why Some Nations are Rich but Most Remain Poor (London, Penguin Books 2003) 8-10 and 273-274; on the 
contrary, ‘unrestrained greed’ and ‘weak government’ are antithetical to free market ideals.  
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welfare and attempting to avoid the unpleasantness of the dark side of capitalism.5 Nyerere 
abhorred the individualism of private property rights and encouraged community living based 
on joint effort for the common good.6 The experiment did not end well and Tanzania’s 
economy is still mired in poverty, disproportionately dependent on agriculture and foreign 
aid. The causes of economic failure are complex and multi-faceted, but Tanzania’s experience 
offers a poignant illustration of Kay’s point about the embeddedness of capitalist markets 
within the broader institutional framework: the legal, cultural, historical and political context 
within which markets function is just as important as, and perhaps even more important than, 
the processes of technological innovation and productive exchange.7  In that context, it is 
clear that legal rules strongly influence economic outcomes. For those concerned with 
economic development the implication is that a comprehensive account of the role played by 
legal institutions in facilitating growth and prosperity is essential in evaluating the integrity 
and sustainability of the capitalist model.  
With that in mind this discussion turns the spotlight onto the legal regulation of a particularly 
important facet of market exchange, namely the exchange between labour and capital. In 
common law jurisdictions that exchange is primarily regulated by labour and employment 
law, complemented by other fields governing specific interactions between employer and 
employee such as company law, tax law, social security and pensions regulations. Any attempt 
to evaluate the effectiveness of policies designed to support economic progress, together 
with the attendant social welfare safeguards, requires this broad range of legal principles to 
be understood as a coherent whole. Yet the legal framework is too often fragmented into 
                                                          
5 Kay (ibid): ‘Julius Nyerere stands out among the corrupt and vainglorious politicians of modern Africa for his 
decency and integrity. A socialist who believed in planned development, he devoted himself to the welfare of 
his people in twenty-one years as president’, 271. Nyerere was a graduate of the University of Edinburgh, where 
he read Economics and History, and was subsequently leader of Tanzania between 1961 and 1985. 
6 The issue, as Nyerere saw it, was how to adopt the benefits of capitalism without taking on the costs: ‘Our 
problem is just this: How to get the benefits of European society – the benefits which have been brought about 
by an organization of society based on an exaggerated idea of the rights of the individual – and yet retain the 
African’s own structure of society in which the individual is a member of a kind of fellowship?’ quoted in T 
Moloney, Nyerere: The Early Years (Somerset, Boydell and Brewer 2014), 154. 
7 ‘It would be wonderful – and very profitable – if the technology, capital and equipment used productively in 
rich states could be transferred to poor countries which have not simultaneously evolved a matching set of 
social, cultural and political institutions’: Kay (n 4), 271. Deaton makes a similar point, observing that ‘One of the 
stunning facts about global poverty is how little it would take to fix it, at least if we could magically transfer 
money into the bank accounts of the world’s poor’; instead, in reality ‘what surely ought to happen is what 
happened in the now-rich world, where countries developed in their own way, in their own time, under their 
own political and economic structures’: (n 2), 268, 312. 
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disparate legal fields all pointing towards conflicting policy goals, so that it is not easy to 
evaluate whether the legal framework as a whole provides carefully balanced support for 
economic growth while at the same time upholding widely accepted principles of social 
justice. When faced with conflicting goals, it becomes difficult to offer a considered response 
to claims made by entrepreneurs that there is too much ‘red tape’ obstructing commercial 
activity, at the same time as fears are being expressed by vulnerable workers that there is too 
little legal protection against exploitation. 
To give an example of such conflicting policy goals, company law is largely designed to 
enhance flexibility in industrial organization by allowing the parties to enter into contracts of 
their own choosing,8 while employment law prioritizes the goal of safeguarding employment 
rights by, for example, prohibiting contracts that expose the employee to being overworked 
or underpaid.9 Labour law attempts to protect vulnerable workers with institutional support 
for the minimum wage, by shoring up the work-wage bargain as the central construct of the 
contract of employment and by ensuring that workers are not unfairly dismissed thereby 
defeating their future expectation of employment income. For employment protection to be 
effective it is necessary to encompass as many workers as possible within its protective fold; 
but this immediately threatens to destabilize organizational models based on flexibility and 
arms-length contracting with independent self-employed agents who fall outside the scope 
of employment protection. Hence the gig economy debates have been conducted from 
diametrically opposed perspectives: employment protection on the one hand and freedom 
to choose flexible business structures on the other.10  
The resulting diversification of legal discourse produces discrete and almost ‘hermetically 
sealed’ doctrinal fields11 where labour law focuses on protecting workers from exploitation 
while corporate and financial law prioritize matters related to shareholder value.12 This in turn 
                                                          
8 FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard University Press 1991). 
9 Eg the UK’s Working Time Regulations 1998 and the National Minimum Wage Act 1998. 
10 B Means and JA Seiner, ‘Navigating the Uber Economy’ (2016) 49 University of California Davis, 1511. 
11 As Anderman argues, ‘the endurance of the concept of the business as being solely owned by the employer 
has hitherto been reinforced by the evolution of a UK company law hermetically sealed off from labour law 
developments’: S Anderman, ‘Termination of Employment: Whose Property Rights?’ in C Barnard, SF Deakin 
and GS Morris, eds, The Future of Labour Law: Liber Amicorum Bob Hepple QC (Oxford, Hart 2004), 126. 
12 Notable exceptions, which highlight the value of employees and other stakeholders, include M Moore, 
Corporate Governance in the Shadow of the State (Oxford, Hart 2013), I L Fannon, Working Within Two Kinds of 
Capitalism: Corporate Governance and Employee Stakeholding - US and EC Perspectives (Oxford, Hart 2003), MM 
Blair and MJ Roe, Employees and Corporate Governance (Brookings Institution Press 1999). 
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leads to a situation where the regulatory framework as a whole adopts divergent labour-
oriented and capital-oriented approaches implemented independently without meaningful 
cross-reference to each other.13 A striking example of this divergence is seen in relation to 
decision-making in large corporations, which is governed in distinct ways by both fields. 
Company law vests power in the board of directors, subject to election and monitoring by 
shareholders, under the aegis of a fiduciary obligation to make decisions in the best interests 
of the company as a whole. No mention is made in that field of the employer’s legal obligation 
to consult workers when making decisions and to ensure that worker representatives have 
sufficient information to ensure meaningful consultation.14 For its part, labour law accords a 
prominent role to the legislative framework mandating recognition of trade unions for 
purposes of collective bargaining and also mandating consultation of employee 
representatives during business restructuring such as redundancies associated with selling 
the business or changing the business model. Little if anything is said in this legislation about 
the overriding duty of directors to promote the best interests of the company, whose 
interests are depicted in the relevant case law as the interests of its shareholders.15 Labour 
legislation therefore fails to convey realistically the true impact of the worker consultation 
provisions. This results in a situation where consultation rights may be perceived in labour 
law studies as an effective avenue for worker participation, whereas the truth is that these 
rights invariably yield to shareholder primacy when the company’s directors are making 
strategic decisions. This reality may be entirely overlooked if the labour lawyer has limited 
exposure to the tenets of company law.16 In that light it could be said that the strength of 
                                                          
13 The same divide exists between those who advocate for stakeholder capitalism with a role for labour in 
decision-making (non-contractarians) and those who insist upon shareholder-primacy based on the contractual 
allocation of decision-making rights (contractarians): ‘Contractarians and non-contractarians no longer have 
much of interest to say to one another; indeed, they barely speak the same language. To shift metaphors, those 
of us who adhere to the nexus of contracts model pass those who do not like two ships in the night, with only 
an occasional exchange of broadsides to enliven the proceedings:’ SM Bainbridge, ‘Community and Statism: A 
Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship’ (1997) 82 Cornell Law Review 
856, 860. 
14 M Hall, ‘Assessing the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations’ (2005) 34 Industrial Law 
Journal 103. 
15 Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas [1946] 1 All ER 512: ‘The phrase, “the company as a whole,” does not (at any 
rate in such a case as the present) mean the company as a commercial entity as distinct from the corporators. 
It means the corporators as a general body. That is to say, you may take the case of an individual hypothetical 
member and ask whether what is proposed is, in the honest opinion of those who voted in its favour, for that 
person’s benefit.’ 
16For fuller discussion see W Njoya, ‘The Problem of Income Inequality: Lord Wedderburn on Fat Cats, Corporate 
Governance and Workers’ (2015) Industrial Law Journal 394. 
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Lord Wedderburn’s longstanding support for independent trade union representatives, in the 
context of corporate governance reforms designed to reflect workers’ concerns in corporate 
decision-making, was to a significant degree reinforced by the depth of his insight into the 
inherent weakness of worker consultation principles when viewed in the context of 
shareholder primacy.17 The example of corporate decision-making thus illustrates the benefit 
to be gained from a closer engagement between labour and company law. 
One could perhaps explain the need for divergent doctrinal treatment of what is essentially 
the same substantive issue, i.e. the legal principles governing the obligations of corporate 
decision-makers, as the natural result of doctrinal specialization and the desire to avoid 
regulatory overlap. It is reasonable for each field of regulation to have its own targeted 
concerns, and so it is not surprising that each doctrinal field remains primarily self-
referential.18 The paucity of meaningful engagement between labour-oriented and 
corporate-oriented fields of study is also unsurprising to the extent that they stand almost as 
ideological opponents: the goals of each field are held dear, the stakes are correspondingly 
high, and too close an engagement with the opposing perspective may seem to be at best a 
betrayal of fundamental values and at worst some kind of Faustian bargain. The difficulty 
presented by this state of affairs is that while developments in each field continue to be 
influenced almost exclusively by reference to internal priorities, concerns about social welfare 
will fail to permeate the efficiency-based principles according to which corporations are 
governed, leading to a situation where economic growth is perceived to come only at an 
unacceptable social cost. This then produces a wholesale backlash against capitalism, with 
too little appreciation of the role it plays in sustaining human progress.19 The nexus between 
                                                          
17 Lord Wedderburn’s writings on this question include: ‘Employees, Partnership and Company Law’ (2002) 31 
ILJ 99; ‘Companies and Employees: Common Law or Social Dimension?’ (1993) LQR 220; ‘Trust, Corporation and 
The Worker’ (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 203; ‘The Legal Development of Corporate Responsibilities: For 
Whom Will Corporate Managers be Trustees?’ in KJ Hopt and G Teubner (eds), Corporate Governance and 
Directors’ Liabilities: Legal, Economic and Sociological Analyses on Corporate Social Responsibility (Berlin: Walter 
de Gruyter 1985); ‘The Social Responsibilities of Companies’ (1982) 15 Melbourne University Law Review 1. 
18 Being self-referential does not imply that they must be closed to external influence: distinct fields can be 
understood as ‘autonomous’ and internally coherent, while remaining ‘interdependent’ and ‘cognitively open’ 
to external influence: S Deakin, ‘Legal Evolution: Integrating Economic and Systemic Approaches’ (2011) 7 
Review of Law and Economics 659, 674. 
19 The backlash is global: ‘The divergence between the fortunes of labor (Main Street) and capital (Wall Street) 
has left many on Main Street confused and bitter. In the view of many Americans, company profits seem to 
come at the expense of social well-being. Thus, it is not surprising that the concept of “stakeholder” capitalism 
– a kinder, gentler corporation taking increased social “responsibility” for its many constituents – is in vogue’: P 
Fagan and MC Jensen, ‘Capitalism isn’t Broken’ Wall Street Journal, March 29, 1996, page A-10. 
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capitalism and economic wellbeing becomes particularly compelling if we adopt the broad 
frame of inquiry constructed by Angus Deaton, encompassing ‘material wellbeing, such as 
income and wealth; physical and psychological wellbeing, represented by health and 
happiness; and education and the ability to participate in civil society through democracy and 
the rule of law’.20 All this is central to an evaluation of the social cost of capitalism. 
A more measured approach in evaluating the two faces of capitalism therefore requires a 
close examination of the interplay between a wide range of legal principles regulating the 
labour-capital exchange, with cross-references across doctrinal boundaries, in order to 
evaluate the role of law in capitalist society. On that basis this discussion highlights the social 
welfare function of large companies as an intrinsic part of the company’s internal 
organizational drive for productivity and growth. Hence the ‘company welfare state’21 is 
depicted here as a construct in which social welfare is bound up with the company’s own 
productive goals rather than being inimical to those goals. This in turn enables a more 
complete evaluation of the larger role played by the government-funded welfare state in 
providing income security. The analysis is completed by questioning the wisdom of linking 
social welfare to economic equality, particularly when that link is presented as a justification 
for law reform in the fields of employment law and corporate governance. At present, with 
little meaningful engagement between the opposing sides in the free market versus 
employment protection debates, and insufficient reflection on the interplay between 
progress and inequality, it is difficult to formulate realistic and sustainable solutions to 
pressing social and economic concerns. By following Deaton’s approach, both sides of the 
‘endless dance between progress and inequality’ are given due attention, thereby opening 
new lines of inquiry into the social welfare effects of free markets and casting law reform 
debates in a fresh light.22  
For legal scholars, a clear picture of these interconnections is particularly important in 
addressing two major problems with which this discussion is concerned: first, rising inequality 
and second, the increasing fiscal burden on the welfare state. Large corporations are strongly 
implicated in both problems, with data suggesting that the financialization of corporate 
                                                          
20 (n 2), 24. 
21 F Field, Inequality in Britain: Freedom, Welfare and the State (London, Fontana 1981) chapter 8, 136 et seq. 
22 Deaton (n 2), xiii; for a similar approach in political philosophy see J Tomasi, Free Market Fairness (Princeton 
University Press 2012). 
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governance is one of the causal factors in increasing the gap between senior managers and 
minimum-wage workers23 and accusations that large corporations avoid paying tax and social 
security contributions.24 But even if it is conceded that large corporations are strongly 
implicated in bringing great misery to the modern world, at the same time they are also 
responsible for bringing about the great prosperity enjoyed in our time.25 Both stories are 
important. This discussion therefore straddles the ideological boundaries that too often 
inhibit open debate, with the aim of juxtaposing the two faces of capitalism: the inspirational 
face of innovation, productivity, growth and prosperity,26 and the darker face where financial 
scandals, systemic failures, institutionalised fraud, and rising inequality raise urgent social 
welfare concerns.  
Although the discussion draws primarily upon the law in the UK, these insights also apply to 
the functioning of capitalist institutions in emerging markets in so far as they explain some of 
the reasons why the predominant legal framework in advanced economies has adopted its 
current form. This in turn sheds light on the prospects of success for poor countries wishing 
to realize the benefits of capitalism, namely vibrant economies and an exponential rise in the 
standard of living. While the complexity of economic systems precludes a simplistic 
attribution of success or failure to any single market institution, it is nevertheless helpful for 
those concerned with economic development to understand better the role played by the 
regulation of work in large firms.  
The rest of the discussion proceeds as follows. Part two introduces one of the main reasons 
why capitalism often comes under fire, namely the apparent weakness of law and regulation 
when faced with corporate scandals. Part three critically evaluates the scope of regulatory 
                                                          
23 T Piketty, Capital in the Twenty First Century (Harvard University Press 2014).  
24 ‘Amazon paid just £15m in tax on European revenues of £19.5bn’ The Guardian 10 August 2017; H 
Konkolewsky, ‘Does Uber signal the end of social security?’ https://iloblog.org/2016/07/28/does-uber-signal-
the-end-of-social-security/ 
25 C Mayer, Firm Commitment: Why the Corporation is Failing Us and How to Restore Trust in It (Oxford University 
Press 2013) describing the corporation as a ‘remarkable institution that has created more prosperity and misery 
than could ever have been imagined’, 1. 
26 ‘Today, one person escapes extreme poverty every second, thanks to better economic systems, improved 
knowledge, and cheaper technology in most areas of the world. In just the past year, more than 32 million people 
have escaped poverty, bringing the percentage of the world population living under the international extreme 
poverty line from 9.2 percent to 8.7 percent. The United Nations projects that another 79 million people will 
climb above the extreme poverty line by 2020’: C Hughes, ‘Massive Reduction in Global Poverty Might Be the 
Most Important Development in the World’, June 12, 2017 available at https://economics21.org/html/massive-
reduction-global-poverty-might-be-most-important-development-world-2387.html 
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intervention in market transactions, before focusing in part four on the private law framework 
underpinning free market capitalism. It is significant that the ideals of private property and 
freedom of contract have a comparatively weak presence in societies that have been left 
behind by the industrial revolution and the digital economy. This suggests that the importance 
of private law principles in facilitating market transactions has tended to be overlooked by 
those concerned with socio-economic progress, an oversight which this article seeks to 
redress. To that end, part five advocates for a more careful treatment of the role played by 
corporate law and regulation, focusing not only on wealth distribution but also on wealth 
creation. Part six identifies how consumption patterns and other measures of economic 
wellbeing improve upon the narrow compass of income distribution, thus offering a more 
realistic overview of the social welfare effects of capitalism. The intuition is that an 
overemphasis on equality at the expense of innovation and growth may be a worthwhile 
trade-off in some types of economies but not others, and should therefore be treated with 
caution. Before the discussion concludes, part seven applies these insights to the challenge 
of reconstructing the welfare state as the gig economy threatens to destabilize the 
predominant juridical form of the contract of employment. 
2. Corporate scandals and the boundaries of illegality 
Large corporations offer employment to millions of workers around the globe, but the 
endemic problem of corporate scandals too often spells financial disaster for those workers. 
In a notable case recently investigated by the UK’s Serious Fraud Office, the collapse in 2016 
of the iconic department store BHS triggered the loss of 11,000 jobs and left a £571 million 
pension deficit affecting 20,000 workers. In other recent examples, widespread fraud in 
setting up customer accounts at the venerable American bank Wells Fargo led to the dismissal 
of thousands of its lower-paid employees between 2011 and 2016, while on the other side of 
the globe the discovery of a £5 billion accounting scandal at the South African firm Steinhoff 
International threatened to trigger the demise of Poundland from the British high street in 
December 2017, putting thousands of jobs at risk. The public debate is ongoing as to how law 
should respond, and in particular whether there should be greater scope to hold the executive 
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officers personally liable when the company collapses on their watch.27 This part of the 
discussion offers an overview of some of the challenges faced by law in the wake of such 
scandals, setting the stage for the subsequent discussion in part three about the role of law 
in facilitating and constraining corporate activity. 
It is appropriate to begin by observing that following the insolvency or collapse of large 
companies thousands of ordinary workers lose their jobs and their expectation of future 
income, while the corporation’s controllers often move on to the next opportunity with a 
bonus and a promotion, or perhaps retire with a so-called golden parachute.28 The asset-
partitioning function of company law separates the personal fortunes of shareholder-
controllers from the assets and liabilities of the company as a separate legal entity, thus 
shielding the directors and other company executives from financial disaster in the absence 
of fraud or other illegality. The ability of wealthy controllers at the helm of the company quite 
lawfully to insulate themselves from the financial risks to which their employees remain fully 
exposed strikes many observers as unconscionable and thereby threatens to undermine 
public confidence in the principle of limited liability which enables corporate entities to 
flourish. There are further concerns regarding the capacity of the public purse to meet all the 
social welfare claims that displaced workers are entitled to make including compensation for 
their lost wages and pensions, as the collapse of a single large company often gives rise to 
significant costs in the form of government bail-outs that may amount to millions of pounds.29  
One of the difficulties in attributing legal liability in these situations lies in distinguishing 
between unlawful activity and those transactions that, although lawful, nevertheless incur 
critical opprobrium.30 It has been established since Salomon that while a director may have 
                                                          
27 M Croser, ‘Carillion collapse shows need for company reform’, The Guardian January 22, 2018, arguing that 
there is a need to reform the Companies Act to ensure better outcomes for employees and other stakeholders. 
28 The BHS case is typical in that respect: ‘Many of those closest to the decisions that led to the collapse of BHS 
have walked away greatly enriched despite the company’s failure’: BHS: First Report (n 3), par. 7. The Report 
concludes: ‘The truth is that a large proportion of those who have got rich or richer off the back of BHS are to 
blame. Sir Philip Green, Dominic Chappell and their respective directors, advisers and hangers-on are all 
culpable. The tragedy is that those who have lost out are the ordinary employees and pensioners. This is the 
unacceptable face of capitalism’: par. 168. 
29 ‘Carillion collapse: Ministers under pressure over taxpayer bill after admitting to unknown 'insolvency costs', 
The Independent, January 16, 2018; Carillion collapse leaves 30,000 businesses losing out on up to £1bn,’ The 
Telegraph, January 16, 2018. 
30 There is, of course, a normative debate concerning the appropriate boundaries of the law, but the point 
remains true that regardless of where the boundary lies there is still an analytical distinction between legal 
liability and social disapproval of corporate conduct. 
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behaved in a manner that is widely considered to be shameful, that conduct may well amount 
to a breach of ‘moral duty’ but it will not, on that basis only, be in breach of the law.31 While 
the issue in that case concerned the validity of incorporation, the ruling in Salomon continues 
to capture the legal imagination for its exegesis on the relevance of moral probity to the 
operation of company law. There is enduring fascination with the ‘essentially ethical basis of 
the decision about whether Aron Salomon acted with appropriate decency to people with 
whom he did business,’32 first by incorporating his business without alerting his creditors as 
to the full implications (incorporation is a matter of public record so his creditors could and 
should have looked to their own welfare33) and then compounding his sins by taking out 
secured debentures giving legal priority to his personal financial claims on the collapsed 
business and thereby defeating the claims of his unsecured creditors (also perfectly lawful as 
the insolvency was not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the transaction 34).  
Drawing analytical distinctions between lawful and unlawful conduct is not the only 
challenge; the relevant evidence must then be found to prove the existence of fraud or other 
illegality to the required standard of civil or criminal proof. To illustrate the difficulties 
involved, it has been estimated that approximately two thirds of all frauds in the US remain 
undetected.35 This includes matters that are inherently difficult to identify or prove such as 
‘lying about the future’ for instance when raising capital based on proposed new projects.36 
                                                          
31 ‘Whatever may be the moral duty of a limited company and its shareholders, when the trade of the company 
is not thriving, the law does not lay any obligation upon them to warn those members of the public who deal 
with them on credit that they run the risk of not being paid’: Salomon v Salomon & Co [1897] AC 22, 40 (Lord 
Watson). As Lord Halsbury said, ‘Whether such a result be right or wrong, politic or impolitic, I say, with the 
utmost deference to the learned judges, that we have nothing to do with that question if this company has been 
duly constituted by law; and, whatever may be the motives of those who constitute it, I must decline to insert 
into that Act of Parliament limitations which are not to be found there’, 34. 
32 AC Hutchinson and I Langlois, ‘Salomon Redux: The Moralities of Business’ (2012) 35 Seattle University Law 
Review 1109. See also P Ireland, ‘Limited Liability, Shareholder Rights and the Problem of Corporate 
Irresponsibility’ (2010) 34 Cambridge Journal of Economics 837 for an argument that the law ‘institutionalizes’ 
corporate irresponsibility. 
33 Said Lord Macnaghten: ‘The unsecured creditors of A. Salomon and Company, Limited, may be entitled to 
sympathy, but they have only themselves to blame for their misfortunes’ Salomon v Salomon (n 31) 53. 
34 Lord Macnaghten observed that Salomon’s primary motive was a desire to expand his business and provide 
for his family, but unfortunately he soon encountered a market downturn: ‘My Lords, I cannot help thinking that 
the appellant, Aron Salomon, has been dealt with somewhat hardly in this case…The company had a brief career: 
it fell upon evil days. Shortly after it was started there seems to have come a period of great depression in the 
boot and shoe trade’ and Salomon’s efforts shore up his company failed: ‘Mr. Salomon seems to have done what 
he could [but] the temporary relief only hastened ruin’ Salomon v Salomon (n 31), 47, 49. 
35 A Dyck, A Morse and L Zingales, ‘How Pervasive is Corporate Fraud?’ (April 2017) available at 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Adair%20Morse%20How%20Pervasive%20is%
20Corporate%20Fraud.pdf. 
36 Ibid, 4. 
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The estimated cost of all fraud in US publicly traded firms amounts to ‘between $180 and 
$360 billion a year’ including not only the cost of detected fraud but also the residual loss in 
enterprise value from frauds that go undetected as well as losses borne by all firms in the 
relevant industry, not just the individual firm that perpetrated the fraud.37 In the aftermath 
of the collapse of a large corporate employer, there is a further challenge in establishing a 
causal link between such fraud and the subsequent losses sustained by creditors or 
employees. Again, it has been well established since Salomon that an allegation of fraud 
requires something more than a ‘loose and general’ advertence to the collapse of the 
company plus the fact that the controller appears to have creamed off all the profit before 
bailing out leaving the company’s coffers empty and the creditors unsatisfied.38  
Fraudulent intent to deceive, as distinct from an unfortunate downturn in the market such as 
that which befell Mr Salomon, may be difficult to establish following insolvency. This was a 
complicating factor in the BHS collapse, as sales were struggling and there were industry-wide 
workplace pensions challenges.39 As in Salomon’s case, there was a public perception that it 
was morally wrong for the controlling Green family to retain their financial gains following a 
catastrophe that defeated innocent stakeholder claims; but in the absence of fraud it was not 
unlawful for the Greens to increase their personal wealth by drawing upon the profits of BHS 
(it is not unlawful to be a wealthy capitalist). Such conduct may potentially amount to a breach 
of trust: Philip Green was criticised for profiting at the expense of the company’s own 
sustainability and success,40 a serious allegation given that conduct undermining the long 
                                                          
37Ibid, 34. 
38 ‘The allegations of the company…were meant to convey a charge of fraud; and it is unfortunate that they are 
framed in such loose and general terms. A relevant charge of fraud ought to disclose facts necessitating the 
inference that a fraud was perpetrated upon some person specified’: Salomon v Salomon (n 31), 35. 
39 ‘The reason BHS has gone bust is no mystery. Shoppers’ tastes have shifted and fusty old BHS hasn’t kept up’: 
B Chu, ‘BHS: What's the real story behind the collapse of the 88-year-old department store?’ The Independent, 
25th April 2016. The pensions regulator observed: ‘we recognise that the emergence and increase in the size of 
the deficit of the [pension] schemes was in part due to economic and demographic factors which have affected 
nearly all [Defined Benefit pensions] schemes’: The Pensions Regulator, Regulatory Intervention Report: issued 
under section 89 of the Pensions Act 2004 in relation to the BHS pension schemes (June 2017), 30. 
40 ‘the Green family became incredibly wealthy, partly on the back of BHS, but in doing so reduced the capacity 
of the company to invest and succeed’: BHS: First Report (n 3), par 3. This was achieved by ‘the Green family 
paying itself dividends far in excess of company profits’ (par 10) and failing to ‘invest enough to maintain the 
value of the company’ (par 14) although in Philip Green’s view, shared by some other shareholders, ‘the 
company was profitable and the dividends were conservative’ (par 11). 
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term success of the company is a fundamental breach of a director’s fiduciary duties.41 For 
publicly traded companies, this statutory duty is supplemented by a Corporate Governance 
Code setting out institutional best-practice guidelines with which companies must ‘comply or 
explain’.42  
Yet ascertaining precise grounds of liability in these circumstances may still prove difficult; in 
the end Philip Green was issued with a Warning Notice under the Pensions Act,43 on the basis 
that he had a personal liability to make a financial contribution to the scheme.44 This liability 
did not arise simply from selling the company to a buyer who turned out to have no feasible 
means of redressing ongoing concerns regarding the pensions deficit. Rather, Sir Philip’s 
alleged failures, as previously highlighted by the parliamentary inquiry into the BHS collapse, 
lay primarily in doing nothing, or nothing sufficient, to bolster the pension schemes while he 
was at the helm despite numerous opportunities to do so. The inquiry took the view that he 
should not escape his ‘moral duty to act’ by the simple expedient of selling the company.45 
This reasoning is to a degree reflected in the broad scope of legal liability of former directors 
for breaches of fiduciary duty or wrongful trading that occurred before they resigned from 
their post.46 However, although Sir Philip ultimately paid £363 million to the pensions 
regulator to settle the matter he insisted that his ex post, and indeed ex gratia, contribution 
                                                          
41 s.172 of the Companies Act 2006: ‘A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, 
would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole’; for a 
helpful discussion see Mayer (n 25).  
42 The Code, published by the Financial Reporting Council, is not legally binding but any non-compliance must 
be explained. The BHS Report found ‘a paucity of challenge and oversight which allowed Sir Philip to run it as a 
family empire’ conduct which, if it occurred in a public company, would clearly violate core principles of the 
Code: BHS: First Report (n 3). 
43 The Warning Notice alleged that ‘the main purpose of the sale was to postpone BHS’ insolvency to prevent a 
liability to the schemes falling due while it was part of the [Green family] group of companies’ Regulatory 
Intervention Report (n 39), 29; accordingly he was issued with a Contribution Notice requiring him to make a 
cash payment to the pension scheme (n 39), 22. 
44 The matter was eventually settled: ‘the settlement reached was expressly on the basis of no admission of 
liability on the part of Sir Philip Green’ (Ibid, 2). The company’s new owners were later convicted under s 72 of 
the Pensions Act: ‘The former owner of BHS, Dominic Chappell, has been ordered to pay a £50,000 fine and 
£37,000 court costs for failing to disclose vital details to the pensions watchdog as part of its investigation into 
the collapse of the high street chain’ The Guardian, 23 February 2018. 
45 The Parliamentary Select Committee was concerned not just with ‘the growth of BHS’s pension deficit’ but 
also with ‘the repeated failure of Sir Philip Green and his directors to take opportunities to resolve it’; the Report 
concluded that ‘Sir Philip owes it to the BHS pensioners to find a resolution urgently. This will undoubtedly 
require him to make a large financial contribution. He has a moral duty to act, a duty which he acknowledges’: 
BHS: First Report (n 3), par. 173. 
46 s. 170 Companies Act 2006: ‘The general duties specified in sections 171 to 177 are owed by a director of a 
company to the company…those duties apply to a former director as to a director, subject to any necessary 
adaptations’. 
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to the BHS pension pot was prompted not by the strength of the legal case against him but 
by his desire to ‘behave like a gentleman’.47 
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the legal framework regulating financial 
conduct does not inspire confidence. The widespread public sense that more can and ought 
to be done by the legal framework to establish liability on the part of specific individuals is 
understandable. Yet more law is not always the answer; in the context of workplace pensions 
tighter regulations may well help to make these schemes more secure but only at the risk of 
reducing the scope and effectiveness of available coverage.48 As in other financial contexts, 
this has raised concerns that ‘the response throughout history to financial crises is to seek 
more regulation’49 which in turn throws up a new set of long-term problems as was seen after 
the last global financial crisis.50 Short-term patches based on more stringent regulation do not 
always resolve complex problems.51 For instance, in the determination to claw back money 
from former executives of failed companies or current executives who are guilty of being paid 
‘too much,’ new regulations are periodically introduced that are promptly side-stepped by 
highly adept ‘transaction engineers’52 using clever strategies and devices that will in time 
                                                          
47 J Phillips, ‘Green Defends BHS Record: “I behaved like a gentleman”’ Professional Pensions, 16 April 2008 
available at https://www.professionalpensions.com/professional-pensions/news/3030249/green-defends-bhs-
record-i-behaved-like-a-gentleman. Frank Field MP, who chaired the parliamentary inquiry, might beg to 
differ; in his view ‘Sir Philip Green stripped BHS bare and then left it for dead, with contemptuous disregard for 
the pensioners’: S Butler, ‘Green’s ‘main purpose’ in BHS sale was to avoid pension liability, says watchdog’ The 
Guardian, 27 June 2017. 
48 ‘the UK government’s response to “events”, such as Maxwell, Equitable Life, BHS – fuelled by the reporting 
of such events in the media, is to apply more and more regulation across the whole sector. This may mean that 
members of pension schemes are better protected but the decline of [defined benefit pensions] has shown 
that such protection comes at a price – far fewer new and young employees covered by such benefits. Over-
regulation also makes pensions more complex and harder for ordinary people to understand’: B Scott, Chair 
Association of Consulting Actuaries (ACA) available at http://www.actuarialpost.co.uk/article/lets-hear-more-
about-pension-good-news-says-aca-chair-13462.htm 
49 Mayer (n 25), 58. 
50 ‘the political pressure to be seen to act in the face of failure is overwhelming and, as night follows day, we will 
see a significant extension and tightening of regulations that will undermine the operation of financial markets 
for years to come’: ibid, 59. 
51 ‘What is wrong with responding to financial crises with strengthened regulation? Numerous things: for one, 
the horse has bolted. Those people who were lucky enough to escape before the crash have made their fortunes; 
those who did not have suffered their losses…Second, regulation is pro-cyclical. Just as a steady relaxation of 
regulation during the first part of this decade encouraged increased investment and asset price rises, thereby 
fuelling the bubble, so too a tightening of regulation will now raise the cost of capital, discourage investment, 
and exacerbate the downturn’: ibid, 59. 
52 As said in the aftermath of new financial market regulations in the US, ‘we await the next alter-ego-based 
innovation from Wall Street’s transaction engineers with an incomplete menu of defensive responses’: WW 
Bratton and AJ Levitin, ‘A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal: From Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs’ 
(2013) Southern California Law Review 783, 784. 
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trigger the next scandal. As Kevin Murphy observes in his study of historical attempts to 
regulate executive pay, successive regulatory reforms designed to close the corporate wage 
cap have seen companies ‘circumventing or adapting to the reforms, usually in ways that 
increased pay levels and produced other unintended (and typically unproductive) 
consequences.’53 Regulators attempting to outsmart corporate executives in the hope of 
beating them at their own game have so far not been successful. 
Hence the efforts to achieve fair outcomes for all the corporation’s stakeholders would be 
better off to begin by acknowledging that the legal framework offers enormous scope for 
flexibility in corporate organization and management, which in turn militates against 
traditional regulatory approaches. Furthermore, the examples discussed here show that the 
distinction between lawful and unlawful activities does not necessarily correspond to public 
expectations of basic fairness and morality-based ethics, a lesson that has historically been 
reiterated by the courts in the long line of unsuccessful attempts to ‘pierce the veil’ and hold 
companies liable to pay the debts of associated entities that are, in law, separate legal 
persons. In this context considerations of ‘justice’ are not, by themselves, a sufficient ground 
giving courts jurisdiction to set aside lawful commercial arrangements.54 The ideology of 
shareholder primacy and the norms associated with efficiency and profit-maximisation have 
therefore proved in common law jurisdictions to be remarkably impervious to justice-based 
anti-capitalist arguments.55  The law continues to operate broadly within a framework of 
facilitative default rules, tax incentives and voluntary codes of conduct.56 The UK 
                                                          
53 K Murphy, ‘Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There’ in G Constantinides, M Harris 
and RM Stulz (eds), Handbook of the Economics of Finance (Amsterdam, Elsevier Science North Holland 2013), 
211, 214. 
54 In Adams v Cape Industries [1990] Ch 433 it was argued, unsuccessfully, that an award of damages by an 
American court should be enforced in the UK against the parent company (a separate legal entity) on the basis 
of ‘natural justice’ or ‘substantial justice’. Further progress in ‘lifting the veil’ has resorted to the sphere of tort 
law, with a broader interpretation of the duty of care and vicarious liability (Chandler v Cape Plc [2012) EWCA 
Civ 525), and the law governing constructive trusts (Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34). 
55 H Hansmann and R Kraakman, 'The end of history for corporate law' (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 439; 
WT Allen, ‘Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law’ (1993) 50 Washington & Lee Law Review 1395. 
Attempts to reform company law ‘from within’ have met with limited success: P Ireland, ‘Corporate Governance, 
Stakeholding, and the Company: Towards a less Degenerate Capitalism?’ (1996) 23 Journal of Law and Society 
287. 
56 This still reflects the future outlook: ‘SOX's [Sarbanes-Oxley’s post-crisis securities regulation in the US] 
corporate governance provisions should be stripped of their mandatory force and rendered optional. Other 
nations, such as the members of the European Union who have been revising their corporation codes, would be 
well advised to avoid Congress' policy blunder [in displacing ‘disclosure requirements’ with ‘explicit legislative 
directives’]’: R Romano, ‘The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance’ (2005) 114 
Yale Law Journal 1521, 1529. 
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Government’s latest corporate governance proposals may appear to buck this trend, for 
instance by promising to do more to tackle fat cat company executives and to prompt 
directors to engage more effectively with the company’s stakeholders, but these proposals 
can hardly be described as revolutionary since they are intended to update rather than 
overhaul the existing regulations.57 Against that background the next part of the discussion 
examines in more detail the role that ought to be played by law in responding to these 
concerns. 
3. Scope of regulatory intervention 
The problem of corporate mismanagement seems at first sight to call for a more proactive 
regulatory approach, for example by anticipating and forestalling egregious cases of fraud, 
rather than belatedly introducing ad hoc regulations to address such scandals after the event. 
The idea behind being more proactive would be to specify in advance the activities that would 
be wrongful or fraudulent should they occur. An example of this approach is seen in the 
Insolvency Act which attempts to capture not only cases of carrying on business while 
insolvent with intent to defraud creditors or for any fraudulent purpose under s. 213, but also 
cases where although not insolvent, the directors carried on trading when they ought 
reasonably to have foreseen the likelihood of going insolvent in the near future.58 But the 
difficulty with prohibiting activities that are probably going to end in disaster is that many 
business activities are inherently risky.59 Prohibited activities must therefore be defined with 
an eye to the desirability of encouraging businesses to undertake the risks of operating in 
fluctuating markets.    
                                                          
57 ‘The aim of the green paper consultation was to consider what changes might be appropriate in the corporate 
governance regime to help ensure that we improve business performance and have an economy that works for 
everyone’: Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Corporate Governance Reform: The 
Government Response to the Green Paper Consultation, August 2017, 2, available at 
https://beisgovuk.citizenspace.com/strategy/corporate-governance-reform/ 
58 The Insolvency Act 1986 s. 214 imposes liability on directors or former directors of insolvent companies if ‘at 
some time before the commencement of the winding up of the company, that person knew or ought to have 
concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent 
liquidation’. 
59 These risks arise from factors that are difficult to legislate for: ‘for many firms, a high probability of failure 
largely reflects idiosyncratic risk, with distress occurring regardless of the condition of the economy. Such 
failures can stem from a lack of innovation, competitive pressures, industry maturity, idiosyncratic shocks to 
operations, or decreased product demand’: M Ogneva, JD Piotroski and AA Zakolyukina, ‘Accounting 
Fundamentals and Systematic Risk: Corporate Failure over the Business Cycle’ (2017) University of Chicago 
Booth School of Business Working Paper No. 14-31, 1. 
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This then is the challenge in regulating market transactions. Viewed from an ex ante 
standpoint facilitating such transactions can lead to either good or bad public welfare 
outcomes and it is not straightforward to issue pre-determined declarations on the precise 
types of transactions that ought to be encouraged or forbidden. To draw once again from the 
BHS saga, selling a company for £1 or some other nominal sum may appear suspicious 
especially when the buyers are men with doubtful track records,60 but such a sale transaction 
in relation to a struggling company is not in itself such conclusive evidence of wrongdoing that 
it ought to be prohibited in all cases. On the contrary it may be beneficial to encourage such 
a sale where the buyer promises to rescue a failing company and thereby secure the 
employees’ jobs as happened when various attempts were made to rescue Rover, the ailing 
British car manufacturer.61 In the interests of facilitating corporate rescues it could be argued 
that the legal framework ought not only to permit, but indeed to encourage, companies to be 
bought and sold at market prices and even restructured to meet shareholder priorities where 
this would incentivize a further investment of new capital by shareholders. After all, if the 
company fails then all the jobs will be lost. Moreover, shares are intended to be easily and 
speedily transferable in order to facilitate vibrant stock markets, and following the transfer of 
shares the transferor is in principle off the hook for any legal liability subsequently incurred 
by the company. On the face of it the whole point of company law is to ensure that the 
shareholders’ personal assets cannot be called upon to satisfy the company’s liabilities, and 
while it is true that in some situations there may be statutory power to pursue the directors 
or shareholders personally this generally depends on evidence of fraud or other illegality. 
Another regulatory challenge in responding to corporate scandals arises when the events 
preceding the disaster are already common knowledge among the firm’s employees and 
managers,62 and perhaps even revealed to the financial press by whistle-blowers long before 
                                                          
60 Having between them an extensive personal involvement with previous insolvencies and no feasible means 
of rescuing BHS: ‘It was clear that Chappell’s team was woefully short of the requisite experience and expertise, 
notably lacking the credible senior retailer on whom Sir Philip once insisted. They could offer no equity and had 
no means of raising funds on a sustainable basis’ BHS: First Report (n 3), par 112.  
61 C Villiers, 'The Rover Case (1) The Sale of Rover Cars by BMW—the Role of the Works Council' (2000) 29 
Industrial Law Journal 386; J Armour and S Deakin, 'The Rover Case (2)—Bargaining in the Shadow of TUPE' 
(2000) 29 Industrial Law Journal 395. 
62 ‘Carillion’s financial problems have been well-known in the city and no doubt with senior civil servants for over 
a year’: Croser (n 27). 
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the volcano finally erupts.63 The difficulty here is that if the impression has plausibly been 
created that the activity is nothing secret and therefore presumably above board, then after 
the fact it may be questioned whether investors or other stakeholders with full knowledge of 
all the material facts can credibly claim to have been misled or deceived.64 In the ensuing 
chaos there may not be sufficient evidence of any precise wrongdoing, particularly in 
situations where the managers and senior executives were either privy to the activity that 
triggered the collapse or at any rate turned a wilful blind eye to what was going on.65 There 
have been suggestions that financial regulators who are inclined to see their role as that of 
facilitating fast-changing capital markets may sometimes regard the shortcuts and unethical 
stratagems of ambitious young traders as simply part of the culture.66  In the Wells Fargo 
example, the bank was actually ‘famous’ for the cross-selling practices that quite predictably 
incentivised the fraud.67 Corporate collapses are in that sense systemic and cyclical, more 
accurately viewed as an endemic feature of capitalist market economies than as surprising or 
exceptional occurrences. The challenge for regulators is that there is no straightforward or 
rational way to explain how an open and commercially widespread approach to doing the 
very activities envisaged and indeed encouraged by law can possibly be ‘wrongful’ in the 
absence of evidence of fraud or breach of trust. 
This raises a more fundamental question of greater urgency for many analysts of capitalism, 
and indeed for some of the judges who find their hands tied in cases where the company’s 
                                                          
63 Whistle-blowers including employees and journalists are more instrumental in exposing corporate fraud than 
the lawyers, auditors, investors and non-executive directors who are officially deemed to fulfil the monitoring 
function in the company: A Dyck, A Morse and L Zingales, ‘Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?’ (2010) 
65 Journal of Finance 2213. 
64 As was said by Lord Watson in Salomon, in relation to the conduct of Mr Salomon that was alleged to be 
fraudulent, ‘it is clear that if so, though he may have been its originator and the only person who took benefit 
from it, he could not have done any one of those things, which taken together are said to constitute his fraud, 
without the consent and privity of the other shareholders’ (n 31), 39. 
65 News reports exposing the fraud at Wells Fargo, including cases where customers had launched litigation, 
stretched back for up to 10 years; Bernie Madoff infamously got a 150 year prison sentence for fraud in respect 
of activities that had been going on for decades and into which, he argued, his investors had simply preferred 
not to inquire too closely as they were happy with the returns he offered on their investments even though 
those returns were at the very least ‘highly suspicious’: C Bernard and PP Boyle, ‘Mr. Madoff's Amazing Returns: 
An Analysis of the Split-Strike Conversion Strategy’ (2009) 17 Journal of Derivatives 62. 
66 In essence, corruption and fraud are perceived by some within the financial services sector and even by some 
regulators as quite normal: JS Nelson, ‘The Corruption Norm’ (2017) Journal of Management Inquiry 280. 
67 R Prentice, ‘Wells Fargo Goes Far to Cheat Customers, and It Was Predictable’ University of Texas News, 
September 19, 2016 available at https://news.utexas.edu/2016/09/19/it-was-predictable-that-wells-fargo-
cheated-customers. 
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directors have done something ‘scandalous’ but not unlawful;68 in that context it could be 
argued that the law itself, as currently formulated and independent of questions concerning 
fraud or other illegality, is inherently flawed in so far as it supports the existing framework of 
capitalism.69 Such disillusionment with the ability of law to reform the functioning of capitalist 
institutions with which law itself is complicit explains the shift in the policy debates away from 
legal solutions and more towards the sphere of moral philosophy where considerations of 
social justice can more explicitly inform governance reforms. This shift is reflected in Colin 
Mayer’s call for a closer consideration of the meaning of trust in market institutions, for 
directors and managers to look beyond an exclusive focus on maximizing profits, and for 
policy makers to end their preoccupation with asking what can be done by governments to 
design progressively stricter codes of corporate governance in the futile hope that this 
regulatory method that has repeatedly failed in the past will suddenly produce the anticipated 
results.70 Mayer suggests that rather than looking to governments and regulators to fix 
corporate governance problems, the solution lies in a reimagination of the function of 
corporations and a reinterpretation of how they pursue their goals.  
Mayer’s proposals recall the fact that the most successful corporations are never those whose 
founders dreamed only about profits but rather those who sought to create valuable goods 
and services for the public; hence the overriding function of the corporation in his view is ‘to 
make, develop and deliver things and to service people, communities and nations.’71 In that 
sense his perspective seems at first sight to be diametrically opposed to that of Milton 
Friedman, who is widely derided for saying that the social responsibility of corporations is to 
maximize their profits.72 But on closer inspection it becomes clear that the two perspectives 
                                                          
68As expressed in Salomon in relation to floating charges that are perfectly lawful but also cause great mischief, 
the law sometimes places a higher premium on the convenience of commercial transactions: ‘For such a 
catastrophe as has occurred in this case some would blame the law that allows the creation of a floating charge. 
But a floating charge is too convenient a form of security to be lightly abolished. I have long thought, and I 
believe some of your Lordships also think, that the ordinary trade creditors of a trading company ought to have 
a preferential claim on the assets in liquidation in respect of debts incurred within a certain limited time before 
the winding-up. But that is not the law at present. Everybody knows that when there is a winding-up debenture-
holders generally step in and sweep off everything; and a great scandal it is’ (n 31), 53 (Lord Macnaghten).  
69 See Ireland (n 55). 
70 ‘We should call a halt to this failed experiment in political economy and look elsewhere for alternative 
approaches to the management of 21st century commercial affairs’: Mayer (n 25), 253. 
71 Ibid, 4. 
72 ‘there is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities 
designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open 
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share a similar focus on the essential purpose and function of the corporation. Friedman was 
no more interested than Mayer in profit-making for its own sake; instead Friedman’s welfare-
maximizing approach emphasized the potential of market institutions such as the corporation 
to enhance prosperity and freedom for the vast majority of people. The cogency of Friedman’s 
vision is borne out by the experience of Tanzania referred to in the Introduction, where long 
decades of socialist decline were eventually replaced by efforts to support the operation of 
open markets in a move that has similarly commended itself across the third world with 
promising results: ‘This move to market-oriented, open economic systems has initiated a 
process that is putting 1.2 billion Third World workers into world-wide product and labor 
markets over the next generation.’73  This trend has increased in recent years as the digital 
age makes global markets even more accessible to ordinary traders.74  
While no reasonable person would suppose that open markets are perfectly functional, or 
even less that they are perfectly competitive, liberal thinkers in the classical tradition argue 
that market outcomes are often superior to legislative co-ordination of commercial 
transactions. It is undeniable that some people when left free to externalize their costs onto 
society are probably going to be tempted to do just that if they lack a moral compass or social 
conscience, but the risk with legislative intervention, as adverted to above, is that the attempt 
to prevent such externalities by using law as a proxy for market ordering risks creating even 
bigger externalities.75 The lesson that can be drawn from these different perspectives is that 
regulation, even when it has undoubtedly admirable goals of social justice, must take 
sufficient account of the longer-term implications.76 Otherwise there is a risk of inadvertently 
                                                          
and free competition, without deception or fraud. Similarly, the “social responsibility” of labor leaders is to serve 
the interests of the members of their unions:’ Friedman (n 4), 133. 
73 Fagan and Jensen (n 19), A10. 
74 ‘With relatively modern technology, experience indicates that these Third World workers can produce from 
85% to 100% of the output of their Western compatriots’: ibid. 
75 ‘the creation of one externality then leads to the demand to “solve” that by creating more externalities. This 
is the fallacy that lies at the heart of much current policy. All regulations that restrict actions by private parties 
or restrict the alienability of rights create such externalities, and thereby reduce economic efficiency, wealth 
and freedom’: ibid. 
76 This would entail a cost-benefit analysis; in the context of tackling fraud this may be done by measuring the 
cost of fraud (to ascertain the benefit that would be gained if such fraud did not occur), weighed against the cost 
of regulation (including fees and other costs that would be incurred by firms in order to comply with new 
regulations): Dyck et al (n 35), 30. In the BHS case, costs incurred by the pensions regulator were significant: 
‘each Warning Notice was over 300 pages long and set out the background, specific evidence and legal 
arguments as to why we considered it reasonable for the respondents to have to support the schemes. The 
Warning Notices were also accompanied by a bundle of supporting evidence and expert reports amounting to 
approximately 13,000 documents in total’: Regulatory Intervention Report (n 39), 31. 
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‘killing through regulation the goose that lays the golden egg’, by crushing the creativity and 
innovation that drives new and evolving economic models.77 A more nuanced approach must 
consider what degree or intensity of regulation is required in constructing a coherent legal 
system. To apply that approach in the context of protecting stakeholder interests in corporate 
governance, it is necessary to revisit the interaction between legislation and private law 
principles in governing market transactions. 
4. Private law and wealth egalitarianism  
It is axiomatic that no market economy is perfectly free. Nevertheless it is readily observable 
that the greater the degree of economic freedom the more likely a country is to be 
prosperous; the converse is also true as command and control economies tend to be mired 
in decline. Even without making any claims about causation, these persistent correlations 
lend weight to the argument that if economic freedom based on private ordering tends to 
maximize productivity, wealth and aggregate social welfare then the public-welfare outcomes 
of private decision-making are likely to be superior to the outcomes that can be achieved 
through legislative fiat. This debate has by no means been settled by the deregulation and re-
regulation trends of recent decades; the preference for self-regulating open markets still goes 
a long way in explaining the predominance of default or opt-out rules in company law and the 
orthodox conceptualization of the corporation as a network of contracts.78 It would be quite 
wrong to suppose that because the principles of private law in common law jurisdictions were 
largely developed by the courts in the nineteenth century at the height of the industrial era, 
this means that they no longer have much resonance in today’s post-industrial world. In fact 
the ideals of freedom of contract and the sanctity of private property, together with a see-
no-evil approach to socio-economic inequality, continue to reverberate in the modern 
                                                          
77 R Epstein, ‘Uber and Lyft in California: How to Use Employment Law to Wreck an Industry’, Forbes (Mar. 16, 
2015, 10:57 AM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
78 Bainbridge (n 13). 
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debates.79 The doctrine of private property, in particular, still provides much of the conceptual 
underpinning of the law in capitalist systems.80  
These rationales explain the priority accorded by incorporation statutes to shareholder 
decision-making, and why little is said about social welfare implications of corporate activity 
beyond requiring directors to consider a range of stakeholder interests when deciding what 
is in the best interests of the company. Although it is arguable that multi-stakeholder 
entitlements can be grounded in private law concepts,81 enthusiasts of the private law 
framework are generally unconcerned about the moral and political distributional 
controversies that trouble policy-makers because the efficiency of the common law 
evolutionary process is thought to produce rules which optimize outcomes for society as a 
whole.82 The difficulty with the efficiency thesis is that the envisaged optimality focuses on 
productivity and remains indifferent to the distributive questions prioritized by egalitarian 
theories of justice. That indifference is often justified by arguing that productivity gains in the 
economy should be welcomed even if the proportion enjoyed by individual citizens is not 
precisely equal.83 But in a context where ‘fairness’ is widely understood to encompass 
‘equality’ it is doubtful that self-regulating corporations would ever have sufficient incentives 
                                                          
79 It is scarcely credible today, with a strong ethos of employment protection reflected in the law, that 
indifference to inequality has historically been defended in courts of law: ‘No doubt, wherever the right of 
private property exists, there must and will be inequalities of fortune...And since it is self-evident that, unless all 
things are held in common, some persons must have more property than others, it is from the nature of things 
impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of private property without at the same time recognizing 
as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights’ Coppage 
v Kansas 236 U.S. 1 (1915), 17. For a contextual discussion of this case see LE Blades, ‘Employment At Will vs. 
Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power’ (1967) 67 Columbia Law Review 1404.  
80 ‘Private property capitalist systems are distinguished by the fact that most decision rights are assigned to 
private individuals or organizations. In contrast, socialist or communist systems assign most decision rights to 
the state or the governing party’: MC Jensen, ‘Freedom, Capitalism and Human Behavior: Capitalism’ (1999) 
Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No 1999, 2, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=638802 
81 W Njoya, Property in Work: The Employment Relationship in the Anglo-American Firm (Aldershot, Ashgate 
2007). 
82 Conversely, ‘The policy maker is concerned not only with optimal allocation of resources but also with the 
appropriate distribution of resources as determined by moral and political criteria; he must have regard to the 
effects on income and wealth of a particular decision on allocation’: AI Ogus, ‘Economics, Liberty and the 
Common Law’ (1980) 15 Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 42, 53. 
83 ‘Of the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most seductive, and in my opinion the most 
poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution...The potential for improving the lives of poor people by 
finding different ways of distributing current production is nothing compared to the apparently limitless 
potential of increasing production’: RE Lucas Jr, ‘The Industrial Revolution: Past and Future’ (2003) Annual Report 
Essay, The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis available at https://minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-
region/the-industrial-revolution-past-and-future. 
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to align their distributive choices with public expectations of fairness as equality. This, then, 
is a debate with deep philosophical roots that is by no means settled. As the controversy 
rages, it becomes increasingly important to re-evaluate the role that should be played by 
corporate law. 
Central to the corporate governance debates is the failure of its predominantly private law 
tenets to address the concerns of Rawlsian wealth egalitarians who, if it came to a choice,84 
would prefer equality as a component of social justice to be prioritized above productivity 
and growth.85 In that context it is often argued that social justice, not efficiency, should be 
the primary concern for law and policy-making86 and that principles of equality are an 
essential component of any theory of justice. As private ordering does not allow much scope 
for dealing explicitly with questions of distributive justice, egalitarians often argue that 
ultimate decision-making power should vest in the state or government in order to meet the 
demands of fairness.87 In a time when these perspectives are ascendant and inequality is 
widely considered to be the most urgent problem facing industrialised societies, the legal 
framework regulating companies looks increasingly outmoded and anachronistic to the 
extent that it says nothing about how it will contribute to a more equal society. As observed 
earlier, the mounting pressure for regulation to play a more proactive and interventionist role 
in redressing the gap between rich and poor both at the national and global levels is partly 
                                                          
84 It does not invariably come to a choice; it is often possible to pursue both efficiency and equality through ideas 
such as ‘enlightened shareholder value’ which recognize that the most profitable businesses are often those 
who prioritize the welfare of all their stakeholders. For a discussion see S Deakin and A Hughes, ‘Economic 
Efficiency and the Proceduralisation of Company Law’ (1999) 3 Company Financial and Insolvency Law Review; 
and more generally S Hsu, ‘Inefficient Inequality’ (2016) 5 Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality 1 arguing 
for a better balance between efficiency and equality: ‘I emphasize that this Article does not argue that inequality 
is per se inefficient. Juxtaposed against the arguments raised in this Article are a countervailing set of arguments 
that inequality is not only something to be tolerated but even a necessary ingredient for prosperity’, 4. 
85 For instance, as will be discussed later, Atkinson argues that ‘a smaller cake more fairly distributed may be 
preferable to a larger one with present levels of inequality’: AB Atkinson, Inequality: What Can Be Done? 
(Harvard University Press 2015), 243.  
86 ‘Even if…the common law is efficient, that still leaves open the question whether that makes it “superior” 
law….even supposing that the common law were more efficient, the policy maker might not find it acceptable 
as it conflicts with current notions of social justice. That legal education and the theories of law should be 
preoccupied with economic efficiency rather than with social justice is, I would suggest, almost a contradiction 
in terms’: Ogus (n 82), 53, 54. 
87 Referred to by Ogus as ‘the law of regulation’ which ‘intervenes in the free enterprise process either by 
adjusting the market mechanism through, for example, price or wage fixing, taxation, licensing, quality controls 
or, more drastically, by replacing the market mechanism altogether’ (Ibid, 47). 
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driven by accusations that law is itself complicit in exacerbating the causal and contextual 
factors of economic inequality.  
To respond to those concerns this discussion draws inspiration from John Tomasi’s efforts to 
develop a theory of ‘free market fairness’ that draws upon Rawlsian interpretations of justice 
as fairness but constructs a humanitarian rather than egalitarian concept of social justice.88 
The humanitarian conceptualisation of social justice does not regard distributional questions 
as dispositive; instead, the implication is that: 
‘Social justice is a property not of particular distributions, but of social 
institutions taken as a whole. As such, a demand for social justice does not 
necessarily call for (or allow) immediate state action to adjust or “correct” 
particular distributions. Social justice requires that one take a longer view. It is 
a standard that tells us what sort of macroinstitutional forms we should work 
towards’.89 
From that perspective, the evaluation of regulatory interventions aims to ensure that social 
legislation preserves a meaningful scope for economic liberty and private decision-making. 
Anthony Ogus viewed this contestation as one involving a dual function: ‘the law’s 
conservative role is to maintain liberal and individualist values; its dynamic role is to act as an 
instrument of redistribution. Though different in character, these two functions are of equal 
status: they should attract the attention of the jurist in equal measure.’90 Although Ogus 
approaches this contestation from the converse approach, ie in order to emphasize the 
dynamic role of law as he sees it, his insight regarding the dual function of law is highly 
instructive in this context. This may be elucidated by the distinction Ogus draws between a 
‘market system’ in which the parties are free ‘to pursue their own welfare goals’ through 
private transactions and a ‘collectivist system’ in which ‘the state seeks to direct or encourage 
behaviour which (it is assumed) would not occur without such intervention’ in order ‘to 
correct perceived deficiencies in the market system in meeting collective or public interest 
goals’.91 This is not a straightforward contest between ‘regulation’ and ‘deregulation’, but 
                                                          
88 Tomasi (n 22). 
89 ibid, xix. 
90 (n 82), 54. 
91 AI Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Oxford, Hart Publishing 1994) 1, 2. 
25 
 
rather merits closer analysis of intricate questions concerning the specific types of regulation 
that work best and identifying the situations in which such regulation can or should be 
adopted. Nor is this duality an attempt to forge an uneasy compromise between capital and 
labour by emphasizing superficial mutual goals while papering over deeply rooted conflicts of 
interest and overlooking their incompatible moral commitments.92 Rather than attempting to 
reconcile incompatible ideologies, that duality acknowledges the strength of each perspective 
in its own right, and juxtaposes each perspective against the other in order to acquire a richer 
understanding of the policy priorities that should be pursued in particular contexts and how 
best to achieve the intended outcomes through tailored legal interventions. Framed in that 
way the debate then concerns identification of the appropriate regulatory interventions in 
balancing corporate productivity with fairness for workers. 
5. Reconfiguring corporate regulation 
Assuming that it is not proposed to eschew capitalism altogether but instead to soften its 
harsher edges, mitigate its worst excesses, and include as many people as possible in the 
prosperity and abundance of economic growth,93 and acknowledging that large corporations 
function as the engine of modern capitalist economies, the question is how law can best 
pursue its social justice ideals without undermining the notions of individual economic liberty 
that drive the entrepreneurial spirit. This part of the discussion addresses that question by 
reference to the idea that the market-correcting function of legislation designed to meet 
social-welfare goals might be a useful way to define the role of law in regulating corporate 
                                                          
92 This uneasy compromise is reflected in ideas such as ‘partnership’ and ‘flexicurity’; for a discussion of 
partnership see W Njoya, ‘The EU Framework of Information and Consultation: Implications for Trades Unions 
and Industrial Democracy’ in A Bogg, C Costello and A Davies, Research Handbook on EU Labour Law 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 2016); for a discussion of ‘flexicurity’ see W Njoya, ‘Job Security in a Flexible Labor 
Market: Challenges and Possibilities for Worker Voice’ (2012) 33 Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 459. 
93 This assumption is justified by the fact that some modern interpretations of socialism do not aim to displace 
markets altogether but instead to ensure that markets operate consistently with principles of social justice: ‘My 
purpose, then, is to revise socialism not principally by critiquing central planning under the control of a dictatorial 
party – that would be, today, beating a dead horse – but to argue that the ethics of socialism should be 
reformulated, from being characterized as the elimination of exploitation, to the elimination of distributive 
injustice’: J Roemer, ‘Socialism Revised’ (2017) Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No 2089, 5. Thus the focus 
is less on public ownership and more on how non-market institutions such as democratic processes can help 
resolve market failures and harmful externalities: C Crouch, ‘Entrenching Neo-Liberalism: the current agenda of 
European Social Policy’ in N Countouris and M Freedland (eds) Resocialising Europe in a Time of Crisis (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) 36. For the regulatory implications see R Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World 
(Harvard University Press 1995), 23; for discussion in the context of corporate decision-making see Bainbridge 
(n 13), 889.  
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activity, particularly when corporate strategies have an adverse impact on jobs and 
employment security. Within that theoretical framework corporate decisions that exacerbate 
economic inequality might then be regarded as a signal of market failure. For instance, while 
it is true as observed at the height of the industrial era that in a free country ‘it naturally 
happens that parties negotiating about a contract are not equally unhampered by 
circumstances’94 this inequality may be resolved by legislation designed to equalize the 
bargaining position of the parties through, for example, mandatory recognition of 
independent trade unions.95 If economic inequality can be interpreted in that way as a signal 
of market failure, then targeted legislation designed to implement redistributive goals would 
be an appropriate response, and the justification for imposing restrictions on how the 
company allocates its profits would be self-evident. But the matter is not that simple. 
Addressing the needs of those who are deemed to suffer from the identified market failure 
should be viewed as one step along the road to achieving prosperity for all. Without that 
longer-term framework the attempt to correct a narrowly and perhaps temporally defined 
market failure may simply trigger a new set of deeper and more serious problems.  
This difficulty is well illustrated by the debates surrounding executive compensation. 
Following persistent claims that senior executives are overpaid at the expense of the company 
and its stakeholders, the law in various jurisdictions attempts to divert the company’s profits 
away from greedy executive pockets by direct measures such as caps on executive pay or 
indirect measures such as shareholder oversight of the corporation’s remuneration policies 
and procedures.96 The arguments usually cited in favour of stricter regulation of executive 
compensation rely on notions of corporate accountability, the reasoning being that the 
privileges of incorporation and limited liability, coupled with the inordinate power and wealth 
vesting in large corporations, together give rise to a corresponding moral duty to hold 
themselves accountable to society.97 This in turn leads to the argument that such 
                                                          
94 ‘and thus it naturally happens that parties negotiating about a contract are not equally unhampered by 
circumstances. This applies to all contracts, and not merely to that between employer and employee...’: Coppage 
v Kansas (n 79). 
95 Trade Unions and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992; for a discussion see A Bogg, Democratic 
Aspects of Trade Union Recognition (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2009). 
96 For such regulatory approaches in the US see Murphy (n 50); in the UK see A Dignam, ‘Remuneration and 
Riots: Rethinking Corporate Governance Reform in the Age of Entitlement’ (2013) 66 Current Legal Problems 
401. 
97 J Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law (Oxford University Press 
1993). 
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accountability extends to taking steps to reduce or at least not to exacerbate economic 
inequality: the putative social responsibility of corporations. Hence one of the key proposals 
in the recent corporate governance reform consultation in the UK concerned regulating 
executive pay, and was presented as a way of holding corporations accountable for their 
contribution to rising income inequality by mandating the disclosure of pay ratios.98 The 
regulatory approach here relies heavily on disclosure rules: by disclosing their pay policies and 
remuneration packages corporations open themselves to scrutiny by their shareholders and 
the general public. That approach has so far enjoyed limited success, primarily because of its 
reliance on the exhortatory language of social responsibility or even, as expressed by the 
Supreme Court of Canada, the obligation to be a good corporate citizen.99 This ‘good citizen’ 
language overlooks the reality of fragmented shareholders dispersed across the globe, 
including foreign sovereign wealth funds, who are granted by law the exclusive right to elect 
directors even though they view their investment as purely financial and have no rational 
reason to be interested in the social welfare effects of directors’ decisions.100 In the result, 
nothing much changes and the ‘corporate social responsibility’ initiatives have by now lost 
much of their persuasive force. A fresh approach is needed.  
This is an area where both company law and labour law play a key role. A more joined-up 
approach between the two fields would suggest that a good place to begin, in thinking about 
how to reconfigure the legal framework, is by turning our attention to the concept of 
economic wellbeing as a unifying goal. The next part of the discussion argues that it is in the 
interests of both labour and capital to prioritize freedom from poverty and protection of 
vulnerable workers alongside sustainable economic growth and prosperity with consistently 
rising standards of living. Neither side of this debate is opposed to these goals – they are 
                                                          
98 ‘The Government intends to introduce secondary legislation to require quoted companies to report annually 
the ratio of chief executive total remuneration to the average pay of the company's UK employees, and to set 
out more clearly in remuneration policies the impact of share price growth on long-term executive pay 
outcomes’: (n 57). 
99 BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders [2008] 3 SCR 560; for discussion see E Waitzer and J Jaswal, ‘Peoples, BCE, 
and the Good Corporate “Citizen”’ (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 439. 
100 The problem of rational shareholder apathy and the changing landscape of shareholding including the shift 
of power from institutional shareholders to private hedge funds is discussed by PL Davies, ‘Shareholders in the 
United Kingdom’ in RS Thomas and JG Hill (eds) Research Handbook on Shareholder Power (Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar 2015), 355. 
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simply not agreed on the best means to achieve them and how to set the relevant policy 
priorities in line with their respective moral commitments. 
6. A broader conceptualization of economic wellbeing 
‘Economic growth is the engine of the escape from poverty and material 
deprivation’.101 
For too long economists preoccupied with economic growth and productivity have been 
inattentive to wealth distribution. Defenders of free markets are tempted towards the view 
that unequal distribution is insignificant precisely because they are enamoured of the 
exponential economic growth sparked by industrial and technological innovations. This 
perspective is not difficult to understand, if one considers for example the dominance of 
corporations such as Google or Apple in the modern consumer lifestyle. For their employees, 
large corporations offer attractive perquisites such as healthcare benefits, on-site childcare 
for pre-schoolers, subsidies for the costs of housing, free transportation, free gym 
membership, and the like, benefits which are not required by law and add considerably to the 
economic welfare of their employees. In that context, worrying about the pay ratio between 
their CEOs and the average employee might seem somewhat churlish. Large firms are 
attractive employers precisely because the average pay they offer is generally higher than 
that in smaller firms, especially when bonus payments and other wage-related benefits are 
taken into account; but higher relative pay in such firms does seem to come hand in hand 
with a larger gap between the average and the highest wage in the firm.102 If large firms 
exhibit higher average wages alongside rising wage disparity it seems that the greater 
potential for all workers to earn more money comes bound with the likelihood of greater 
overall income inequality due to the stratospheric wages earned by executive managers. 
Critics would like to see a more equal division of corporate profit between senior executives 
and ordinary employees, or a more equal distribution of returns to private shareholders and 
the public purse through corporate taxes. Such critics pay little or no heed to exponential 
growth or the creation of new and lucrative job opportunities, as they would argue that 
                                                          
101 Deaton (n 2), xi. 
102 S Davis and J Haltiwanger, ‘Employer Size and the Wage Structure in U.S. Manufacturing’ (1995) NBER 
Working Paper No. 5393. 
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increased productivity and economic growth are unsustainable in the longer term if they 
exacerbate the growing gap between rich and poor. They would argue, like the Pope Francis 
in his critique of the ‘economy of exclusion’, that pursuing economic growth must embrace 
all members of society including those who are poor or socially vulnerable.103 This approach 
attaches significance to the fact that rising prosperity disproportionately benefits those 
people, and indeed nation states, who are already privileged in enjoying greater wealth than 
the vast majority of poor people and poor countries.  As observed in the Introduction, Deaton 
has a different perspective on the inequality that follows in the wake of progress: he points 
out that no form of progress has yet been invented that benefits everybody at once, at the 
same moment in time, and in equal measure. He therefore argues that if progress leaves some 
people behind at least in the immediate term that is no reason to denigrate the human 
aspiration to improve material conditions from which everyone will eventually benefit. These 
realities are inextricably bound together in the complexity of the human condition, hence 
Deaton’s observation that ‘the tale of progress is also the tale of inequality.’104 The correct 
response, in Deaton’s view, is not to decry the fact that progress leaves some behind due to 
multiple causes whether deserved or undeserved, but instead to formulate effective means 
by which to improve the lives of those left behind based on priorities that those people would 
consider meaningful (including non-monetary and non-income aspects of wellbeing such as 
access to health, education and free public amenities) rather than striving towards an 
unreachable ideal of equality.  
The efforts of Atkinson and others to put wealth distribution on the policy agenda have 
undoubtedly transformed our understanding of the scope of inequality within and across 
countries.105 But egalitarian interpretations of the significance of the available data do not 
command universal agreement. One of the contentious issues relates to the fact that poverty 
is a relative concept, hence growing prosperity may well, and often does, go hand in hand 
with rising inequality. Everyone is better off, and there are fewer people living in absolute 
                                                          
103 C Clark, ‘Economy of Exclusion: Global Perspectives on Pope Francis on Capitalism’ (2017) 2 Journal of 
Vincentian Social Action 4. 
104 (n 2) xii. 
105 W Salverda, B Nolan and TM Smeeding, Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality (Oxford University Press, 
2009). See further Atkinson (n 85). 
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poverty, but the relatively poor are slightly better off while the relatively rich are much better 
off:  
‘In effect, world economic growth, though strongly inegalitarian, 
contributed to a steady decline in the headcount measure of poverty 
throughout the period under analysis. Over the 172 years considered here, 
the mean income of world inhabitants increased by a factor of 7.6. The mean 
income of the bottom 20 percent increased only by a factor of slightly more 
than 3, that of the bottom 60 percent by about 4, and that of the top decile 
by almost 10. At the same time, however, the extreme poverty headcount 
fell from 84 percent of the world population in 1820 to 24 percent in 
1992.’106 
For the wealth egalitarian, economic prosperity that does not bring greater equality is nothing 
to celebrate. The implication is that if higher average wages in large firms are correlated with 
an increasing spread in wage distribution, it would be justifiable from an egalitarian 
perspective to shrink wages if necessary in order to achieve greater equality of pay.107 Hence 
in formulating redistributive policy proposals Atkinson argues that ‘a smaller cake more fairly 
distributed may be preferable to a larger one with present levels of inequality’ because, in 
keeping with Rawlsian theories of justice, fair distribution is as much a priority as economic 
growth, if not more so.108 In Atkinson’s view the two factors go hand in hand as there must 
be ‘an acceptable trade-off between efficiency and equity’ and what makes the trade-off 
acceptable, in terms of social justice, is how fairly it redistributes wealth. Further, Atkinson 
would expect to see both gains and losses from wealth redistribution – so although economic 
growth might suffer in some respects, that might be offset by efficiency gains in other respects 
owing to factors such as enhanced levels of worker trust and loyalty. It is on this issue – 
decisions about what makes the trade-off between efficiency and equity acceptable – that 
perspectives diverge.109 
                                                          
106 F Bourguignon and C Morrisson (2002) 92 American Economic Review 727, 733. 
107 Similarly, gender pay equality can be achieved by reducing men’s pay: ‘Six male BBC presenters agree to pay 
cuts’ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42827333. 
108 Atkinson (n 85), 243. 
109 At any rate it is not self-evident that political and moral considerations should override efficiency as a 
standard for triggering the coercive intervention of the state-backed authority of law. See Ogus (n 82, n 91) for 
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It is unlikely that divergent theories of moral philosophy will ever reach agreement on 
whether, or when, equality is more important than progress, but by framing the debate in 
terms of economic wellbeing it becomes easier to achieve consensus on the financial needs 
and priorities to be met by the public purse, which in turn has implications for levels of 
taxation and how public funds are allocated. Economic wellbeing is a sustainable goal to work 
towards, whereas the financial burden that must be incurred if the ideal of equality in 
economic life is set up as the relevant target is unlikely to be sustainable in the longer term. 
When the costs of achieving economic equality are taken into account it is easy to understand 
why the potential claims that may be made against wealthy corporations are uppermost in 
the minds of politicians who have promised their electorates that they can square the circle 
by delivering lower taxes, rising prosperity and greater economic equality. Dealing robustly 
with corporate scandals that impose huge social and financial costs on the public would go 
some way towards delivering on those promises, but a deficit inevitably remains. Should 
corporations therefore pay more to contribute to social welfare costs?  
The answer will vary according to whether social welfare costs are computed by reference to 
the goal of achieving socio-economic equality, or by reference to improving economic 
wellbeing, since it is of course possible to achieve rising standards of living and a better quality 
of life without everyone having an equal amount of wealth. Holding this observation in mind 
will militate against the risk of losing sight of the very reason why inequality should matter at 
all: economic equality does not matter for its own sake, but because it offers a way to achieve 
human flourishing and fuller participation in social and economic life.110 Viewed in that way, 
the notion of economic wellbeing is critical not only for wealth egalitarians, but also for 
utilitarians seeking to maximize public goods to be enjoyed by as many people as possible. 
Apart from offering an achievable goal around which consensus can be achieved, that 
                                                          
illustrative examples of how efficiency considerations leave open distributional questions that can only be 
resolved by reference to political and moral values. 
110 For purposes of thinking about economic development, equality is less interesting as an end in itself and more 
for what it helps us to achieve. Some of the relevant questions as framed by Deaton are: ‘what inequality does, 
whether inequality helps or hurts, and whether it matters what kind of inequality we are talking about. Does 
society benefit from having very rich people when most are not rich? If not, does society benefit from the rules 
and institutions that allow some to get much richer than the rest? Or do the rich harm everyone else – for 
example by making it difficult for the nonrich to affect how society is run?’ (n 2), 11, 12. 
32 
 
approach has the added advantage of curbing the quite unaffordable thirst for ever more 
public spending designed to put everyone in society in an equal economic position. 
In working towards the goal of economic wellbeing wage disparities certainly matter, but 
consumption patterns and the overall standard of living are much more important. 
Consumption measures include factors reflecting family wellbeing such as ‘food at home, 
housing and vehicles’ and also take into account tax credits, non-cash benefits, access to 
sources of credit including affordable loans, and social security claims guaranteed by the 
state.111 Bruce Meyer and James Sullivan have captured the importance of these factors 
particularly for those who are socially marginalized; they show that ‘consumption is a better 
predictor of well-being than income for those at the bottom’ especially ‘single parent headed 
families and single individuals, who have the largest increases in income inequality, but the 
largest declines in consumption inequality.’112 These groups may seem much worse off when 
compared to the richest members of society, but over time they are becoming much better 
off in terms of their own quality of life and standard of living. In encompassing a wider set of 
variables including measures of consumption, the material standard of living, and prospects 
for advancement over time, the main implication for the legal regulation of the work-wage 
bargain lies in recognising that income is only one source of wealth, and not always the most 
important one, when evaluating the benefit derived by the worker from a particular job: 
‘While wages are an important component of overall economic well-being, other factors also 
contribute to well-being such as unemployment, disability, retirement, family formation, child 
bearing, health, transfers from family, friends and government, and saving and borrowing.’113 
If the wage is not itself the most important factor, the ratio between that wage and the boss’s 
wage becomes even less material. 
In that light it is not only relevant but indeed highly significant to consider, in assessing the 
significance of rising income inequality, not only how a CEO’s wage compares to the average 
wage in his own firm but also how the lowest wages in his firm compare to the wages of 
                                                          
111 B Meyer and J Sullivan, ‘Consumption and Income Inequality in the U.S. Since the 1960s’ Becker Friedman 
Institute for Research in Economics, University of Chicago, Working Paper Series No. 2017-12, 2. See also their 
argument that ‘conceptual arguments as to whether income or consumption is a better measure of material 
well-being almost always favor consumption’, 7 et seq. 
112 Ibid, 7, 3. 
113 Ibid. Bourguignon and Morrisson also argue that ‘Income is only one dimension of economic well being. Any 
analysis of the evolution of world inequality should also take other dimensions into account’: (n 106), 728. 
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comparable workers in the wider economy. That would give a more nuanced and instructive 
picture of the wage structure of the firm as a whole. Headlines about the growing ratio 
between executive pay and the average wage paid by a firm should be viewed alongside 
consumption trends and patterns.114 High pay understandably attracts more attention than 
consumption because it is easier to define and measure, while the myriad variables affecting 
economic wellbeing are less straightforward to capture than the facts and figures contained 
in income tax records relied on by income inequality studies. But in reality both consumption-
based and income-based measures are incomplete.115 Many elements of human flourishing 
are hardly measured at all, such as the benefit of widely available and virtually free online 
platforms offered by companies like Google, which make it easier for the unemployed to 
escape from social exclusion and make connections with the world of work that would have 
been inaccessible before the digital revolution and therefore now go a long way towards 
raising levels of both income and consumption. As Deaton observes: 
‘the information revolution and its associated devices do more for wellbeing than we 
can measure. That these pleasures are barely captured in the growth statistics tells us 
about the inadequacies of the statistics, not the inadequacies of the technology or the 
joys that it brings’.116  
Taking this into account, it becomes apparent that the problem of inequality is not as linear 
as the income-based studies imply, in so far as they obscure the evidence of less disparity in 
consumption patterns. By highlighting the increasing scope of material, physical and 
psychological flourishing in an increasingly affluent world, a more comprehensive evaluation 
can be made of the role played by private companies in contributing to social welfare.  
It is often feared that the benefits of living in an affluent society, or the creation of jobs in the 
new economy offering attractive salaries, pensions, job-related perquisites and enhanced 
employability opportunities including training and skills enhancement, only benefit the elite 
                                                          
114 ‘Although over the long run consumption should come quite close to permanent income…there can be 
considerable deviations in the short run…Consumption is thus generally considered a better measure of current 
welfare than income’:  FHG Ferreira and M Ravallion, ‘Poverty and Inequality: The Global Context’ in Salverda et 
al (n 105), 599, 601. 
115 Nancy Folbre argues that measures based on income and consumption are both ‘seriously incomplete’ in so 
far as they leave out ‘production and consumption within the household’ through household activities that 
‘represent implicit income’ such as accommodation and meals provided by family members or income-saving 
work done within the home: ‘Inequality and Time Use in the Household’ in Salverda et al (n 105), 342. 
116 (n 2) 327, 328. 
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and privileged high earners. There are also concerns that even though corporate benefits may 
be broadly enjoyed, the nuclear fallout of corporate scandals extends far beyond the initial 
events to create financial instability and ultimately greater socio-economic inequality that 
overrides any welfare gains that might previously have been realized. In that context, what 
should be done about those who are left behind by the great march of progress? To address 
these concerns, the final part of this discussion considers whether large firms contribute 
sufficiently to the social welfare costs of those who need assistance when they fall on hard 
times. The argument is that law and regulation should navigate between enhancing the social 
welfare contributions of firms through tax-related legislation and supporting the company’s 
internal provision of on-the-job welfare benefits offered to their employees so that one does 
not come at the expense of the other. 
7. Implications for the welfare state 
The deleterious effects of economic inequality are in theory mitigated by the welfare state, 
as governments draw upon public funds to provide a safety-net for the poorest and most 
vulnerable in society. In the context of corporate failure, costs such as unemployment 
insurance and pensions are therefore, to an extent, covered by public funds. One of the 
challenges posed by the gig economy is that such costs are becoming unsustainable as large 
corporate employers increasingly embrace the on-demand digital economy with the 
attendant reclassification of workers as ‘self-employed’ for tax and social security purposes 
despite being classified as ‘workers’ for purposes of employment protection.117  Social welfare 
provision is inevitably affected by the changing characterisation of the employment 
relationship and specifically the interpretation of the contract of employment. Just as the 
poor law statutes which preceded the emergence of the modern welfare state were pivotal 
upon the annual service to establish entitlement to poor relief,118 in the modern era social 
security payments during insolvency or after retirement have relied on the status of the 
                                                          
117 S. 230 Employment Rights Act 1996: a ‘worker’ is an individual who works under either a contract of 
employment (i.e. is an ‘employee’) or works under ‘any other contract…whereby the individual undertakes to 
do or perform personally any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of 
the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the 
individual’; for an interpretation of this provision see Clyde & Co LLP v Bates van Winkelhof [2014] UKSC 32. 
118 S Deakin, ‘The Comparative Evolution of the Employment Relationship’ in G Davidov and B Langille, 
Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law: Goals and Means in the Regulation of Work (Oxford, Hart Publishing 
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‘employee’ as the primary guarantor of income security. The role played by the large 
corporation as employer of a significant percentage of workers is therefore central to the 
debate about the future of the welfare state. 
The growing financial burden imposed upon the welfare state by increasing numbers of self-
employed workers is part of a trend witnessed in recent decades as long-term secure 
employment fades into history. These concerns were the focus of the recent Parliamentary 
Select Committee Report (the Field Report), which observed that developments in the gig 
economy have compounded these challenges by creating even more opportunities for 
corporations to shed financial obligations typically based on the employment relationship.119 
The aim of corporations in treating their labour force as self-employed is of course to reduce 
the cost of labour, hence it is perhaps inevitable that the debates surrounding these 
developments have become ‘politically polarized’ as ‘the classification of workers has been 
characterized, perhaps caricatured, as a clash of free-market principles and worker 
protections’.120  
Given the scope for avoidance of income tax and other social security payments, as well as 
the risks posed to ‘independent’ workers if the employer classifies them outside the full 
protective scope of employment law, the Field Report sought ways to ‘protect them from 
hardship and the welfare state from costs’.121 The Field Report highlights the unravelling of 
the ‘social contract’ underlying the welfare state since its early roots in the Beveridge Report 
of 1942, observing that this contract has come under pressure in recent years with more 
people expecting to take out from the system but increasingly fewer people paying in. The 
Report observes that without an overhaul of the old social contract the public purse will 
buckle under the weight of the increasing financial claims being made against it. It is 
significant, as observed by the Field Report, that while the focus before 1942 was on lifting 
people out of poverty, deprivation and want, the modern era of rising prosperity has 
witnessed a widespread shift in public expectations away from concerns about deprivation 
                                                          
119 House of Commons, Work and Pensions Committee Report on Self-Employment and the Gig Economy (May 
2017): ‘The ease with which companies are able to classify their workforces as self-employed both fails to protect 
workers from exploitation, and potentially increases strain on the welfare state’: 3. 
120 Means and Seiner (n 10), 1515, 1516. They observe that ‘Employees cost more than independent contractors 
because businesses are responsible for, among other things, payroll taxes, workers’ compensation insurance, 
health care, minimum wage, overtime, and the reimbursement of business-related expenses’: 1513, 1514. 
121Report on Self-Employment (n 119), 3. 
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and more towards attaining the ideals of economic equality. The goal today is to create a 
society where nobody is vastly richer than other people as framed in the popular slogan that 
‘we are the 99%’.122  
Social welfare, formerly understood as a safety-net to prevent citizens from falling into 
poverty or help them to rise out of poverty, now has a greater significance beyond specific 
payments made in a time of need and is widely regarded as one of the tools available to the 
government to help achieve greater social and economic equality. This shift has played a role 
in contributing to the ‘something for nothing welfare society’123 as the notion of paying in to 
the system under a form of social contract seems quite meaningless if the goal is to ensure 
that everyone should ultimately benefit equally in virtue of their humanity and not in virtue 
of their contribution to the system. As Field observes, the decoupling of welfare pay-outs 
from contributions and the resulting rise in public spending crosses party-political lines; the 
Labour Party began by ‘arguing that equality, not nationalisation, was the party’s goal, and 
the route to equality was greater public expenditure’, an electoral policy that was soon copied 
and indeed surpassed by the Tories so that eventually ‘a ratchet effect that locked in rising 
public expenditure was politically institutionalised between the two major parties’.124 In that 
context, what contribution ought to be made by private companies to help offset rising social 
welfare costs? Should they be required to join in the institutionalisation of rising expenditure 
on social welfare based on achieving economic equality for all regardless of their 
contribution? If the question is framed primarily as one concerning the redistribution of 
wealth, then the ratchet effect seen in the political sphere would extend in exactly the same 
way to private employers. If citizens expect to receive higher levels of public welfare support 
without worrying too much about where the money will come from,125 then it is not much of 
a leap to expect corporations to create jobs, turn healthy profits, survive in a competitive 
                                                          
122 In America, which is perhaps the most capitalist of capitalist nations, it has been observed that fortunes 
change, or may change, so much over a lifetime that income categories are not static and the class of the 99% 
is a class with fluid members: ‘class in America is much more complicated than a simple story of the 1% against 
the 99%. Why aren’t Americans taking to the streets, ready to fight the next class war? It’s because many of us 
wouldn’t know which side we’re on’: C Matthews, ‘The Myth of the 1% and the 99%’ Fortune, March 2, 2015. 
123 F Field, Working Welfare: Contributory Benefits, the Moral Economy and the New Politics (London, Politeia 
2013), 12. 
124 Ibid, 5. Field observes that ‘taxpayers, led by governments, have become accustomed to requesting 
Scandinavian levels of welfare but are, encouraged by decade upon decade of political dog whistling, to believe 
that this goal can be achieved by paying American levels of taxation’: ibid, 11. 
125 Described by Field as a ‘money goes on trees’ expectation among many voters, encouraged by politicians of 
all parties making unaffordable promises when seeking re-election: ibid. 
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global market, and at the same time take steps to equalize income on the simple basis that, 
as argued by the litigants in the Uber case, ‘You can’t have a company making millions and 
workers working below minimum wage.’126  
This discussion has argued that this is entirely the wrong approach. Instead, a more complete 
analysis of the public welfare function served by corporations is called for: new jobs, higher 
rates of employment income, work-related benefits including skills training, and workplace 
pensions are all relevant.127 This contributes to the economic welfare of significant numbers 
of workers: taking the example of London, over half of all private sector workers are employed 
by large firms.128 It is true that large corporations are notorious for doing everything within 
the law to reduce their tax payments, but unless the law has actually been broken this is no 
reason to ignore corporate tax payments when evaluating the contribution of large 
companies to public welfare.129 In sum, the need to constrain financial scandals or ‘excessive’ 
executive pay should not obscure the very real advantages represented by the presence of a 
vibrant and successful corporate and financial sector. In evaluating the functioning of 
capitalism, showcasing the overpaid fat cats is very revealing130 but that cannot be relied upon 
as a basis for legal and regulatory reform. At the same time, painting a more intricate and 
hence more informative picture of the role played by corporations in capitalist systems need 
not entail reverting to the opposite extreme, going back to the era when economists paid no 
attention to questions of distribution;131 the point being advanced here is a call to think more 
carefully about the balance between equality and economic freedom and the role played by 
the welfare state in relation to both goals.  
                                                          
126 L Dearden, ‘Uber ordered to treat drivers as workers with full rights after losing appeal in landmark case’ 
The Independent, 10th November 2017. The question posed by Field in the context of the welfare state then 
has even wider resonance: The need to link inputs with outputs applies just as much to expectations of 
corporate largesse as it does to social security claims on the public purse. 
127 In addition to tax and social insurance payments, the Pensions Act 2008 requires every employer in the UK 
to provide a pension scheme for any employee earning over £10,000 per annum. Contributions are made by 
employer, employee, and the state. 
128 R Prothero, ‘Employment in London by Firm Size’ Working Paper 31 (London, Greater London Authority, 
2008). 
129 ‘An important limitation of the official statistics is that they do not account for tax transfers’ in measuring 
income inequality; hence ‘the debate over inequality relies almost exclusively on income data. Official income 
statistics indicate that inequality has increased sharply. But these official statistics may not accurately reflect 
changes in wellbeing. They ignore taxes and transfers and rely on income that is badly reported in surveys’ Meyer 
and Sullivan (n 111) 1. 
130 Njoya (n 16). 
131 AB Atkinson, ‘Bringing Income Distribution in from the Cold’ (1997) 107 Economic Journal 297. 
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To strike such a balance, the implications for the legal conceptualization welfare state must 
also be considered. Until now it has not been necessary for legal scholars concerned with 
economic development to think in any specific way about the welfare state, the role it plays 
in providing income security, and how that affects the employment relationship. Although it 
has long been recognized that for many workers an important source of income security is 
rooted in social welfare benefits guaranteed by the state,132 legal scholarship has tended to 
skirt around social security matters. As Anthony Ogus observed many years ago, the tradition 
in academic law has been to regard social security regulations as less worthy of intellectual 
study than the legal interpretation of contractual relationships and the proprietary structure 
of organizations.133 But in recent years as employment law has attempted to develop a more 
varied classification of work relationships in order to try and extend the scope of employment 
protection, social security considerations have increasingly come into the spotlight as social 
security law has lagged behind clinging to the old dichotomy between employees and the self-
employed.134 Hence the importance of rethinking the nature of social welfare provision.  
This discussion has suggested a helpful way to understand and depict the interactions 
between law and social security in this context. As defined by Field, the meaning of welfare 
encompasses ‘the provision of cash and services which help to determine the living standards 
of individuals and families.’135 Field’s definition attributes welfare provision to five main 
sources: the traditional welfare state, tax allowances, company welfare in the form of 
workplace pensions and other benefits, inheritance and wealth passed down through family 
ties, and private market welfare such as private insurance.136 Any meaningful welfare system 
must therefore work well across all its facets to avoid overburdening any particular source. 
This highlights the need to redefine the aims and purposes of employers’ financial 
contributions to public welfare levied directly through pension and social security 
                                                          
132 ‘Obviously a person’s wage or salary cheque is important as are the whole range of social security benefits’: 
Field (n 21), 16. 
133 Ogus (n 82). 
134 ‘This very significant crystallization of labour law’s newly tripartite taxonomy of work relations has occurred 
very largely in the context of the on-demand economy, and is beneficial to those located in that sector. It will be 
argued that this is, however, a rather fragile conceptual structure, not least because there is a real tension 
between this system and the still bipartite system which is used to categorise the same set of work relations for 
tax and social security purposes’: M Freedland and J Prassl, ‘Employees, Workers, and the 'Sharing Economy: 
Changing Practices and Changing Concepts in the United Kingdom’ (2017) 6 Spanish Labour Law and Employment 
Relations Journal 16, 17.  
135 Field (n 21), 17. 
136 ibid. 
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contributions and indirectly through corporate taxes, and the importance of ensuring that the 
scope of welfare provision does not impose disproportionate costs on start-up firms in the 
new economy. The argument developed here implies that the nascent gig economy should 
not be met by law with a desperate attempt to cling to traditional forms of the employment 
relationship in the hope of shielding everyone from the pain of creative destruction, but 
instead should be seen as an opportunity to reimagine the role played by the welfare state 
and the way all citizens, including corporations, contribute to it.  
As an increasing number of workers are categorized as self-employed by large corporations 
attempting to deliver their products at prices most consumers are happy with, as well as 
creating opportunities for many non-traditional workers to get involved in new forms of work, 
it becomes increasingly important to reconsider the role played by traditional forms of social 
welfare. The widespread outpouring of concern regarding the exploitation of workers, 
highlighted in a notable example by the ongoing litigation involving Uber, has prompted legal 
scholars to refocus their attention on the traditional distinction between dependent and self-
employed workers.137 But as firms like Uber continue to disrupt traditional certainties about 
the employment relationship, the narrative should not only be about the exploitation and 
suffering of workers. There is also another important side to the story: ‘Advocates extol the 
potential of technological innovation to unshackle workers from the constraints of more 
traditional employment while, at the same time, unleashing the engines of capitalism to 
promote economic growth.’138 Thus the gig economy is the paradigmatic example of the 
problems depicted in this paper: it introduces flexibility and opportunity unknown before the 
digital age, and for that reason is being watched with interest in corners of the Third World 
that had previously been left behind by technological progress; at the same time it meets with 
censure from those concerned about worker exploitation and thereby creates a huge amount 
of confusion about whether all this progress is worth the social cost. In working out the 
answer to this dilemma, the test for external observers should not merely be whether new 
economic models help to reduce inequality, but also whether these models help to advance 
economic wellbeing.  
                                                          
137 See, in the UK, Aslam v Uber BV [2017] IRLR 4, holding that Uber drivers are ‘workers’ falling within the 
scope of employment protection under the Working Time Regulations and the National Minimum Wage Act. 
138 Means and Seiner (n 10), 1518. 
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8. Conclusion 
The increasing polarization of public discourse has impeded the exchange of ideas across the 
ideological divide regarding the costs and benefits of capitalism. From a legal perspective a 
similar polarization is evident between the fields of labour law and company law, where 
competing concerns about employment protection and corporate efficiency have given rise 
to a divergent set of priorities. This discussion has argued in favour of a different approach, 
by juxtaposing distributive justice with economic productivity, identifying some the 
implications of that contestation, and then proposing some ways of thinking about the 
desired outcomes more comprehensively by reference to consumption patterns and other 
non-monetary indicators such as access to education and health. This approach would 
reorient current debates about the interaction between employment protection and social 
security, highlighting the beneficial role played by the corporation in relation to the welfare 
of employees. To that end the discussion highlighted the dual role of large companies in 
exacerbating as well as mitigating various aspects of economic hardship, acknowledging the 
prevalence of costly scandals on the darker side as well as tax and social security contributions 
or work-related benefits and perquisites on the brighter side.  
Given the place of large companies at the very heart of the capitalist economy, this approach 
yields deeper insight into the integrity and sustainability of capitalist economies, that is 
significant not only for law reform debates in liberal market economies but also for economic 
development debates in parts of the world that are still steeped in absolute poverty. This is 
particularly urgent in African economies that are not only poor, but actually marching 
relentlessly backwards crippled by persistent negative growth rates, and thus left behind by 
countries that are constructing their own varieties of capitalism.139 It would be 
unconscionable to send out the message that capitalism is an economic model that is socially 
harmful and therefore requires to be constrained by regulation as much as possible, when 
the truth is that such countries would benefit from entrenching basic principles of contract 
and private property to support the economic freedom that characterises competitive 
                                                          
139 ‘A group of Asian countries – China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand – as 
well as one African country, Botswana, grew at more than 4 percent a year from 1960 to 2010…At the same 
time, the Central Africa Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guinea, Haiti, Madagascar, 
Nicaragua, and Niger are actually poorer in 2010 than they were half a century ago’ Deaton (n 2), 234, 235 
(emphasis in original). For an exploration of different varieties of capitalism see PA Hall and D Sosckice, Varieties 
of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press 2001). 
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markets. The lesson here is that it is critical for the legal framework to strike the right balance 
between social welfare and economic progress, and while the ideals of equality are valuable 
and worth pursuing, these ideals ought not to obscure the benefit to be gained by promoting 
economic wellbeing in a broader sense. For these reasons, in a time when there is no shortage 
of reports of corporate scandals in the daily press, this discussion has sought to highlight the 
merits of the acceptable face of capitalism. 
